MIDDLE EAST REFORM
Measures of political reform in the Middle East have multiplied since the mid 1990’s. In Saudi Arabia, state-sponsored “sessions of national dialogue” have produced recommendations on the public role of women and the promotion of civic institutions. In Bahrain, a reform program was unveiled between 1999 and 2002. In post-Saddam Iraq, debate centers on the new constitution and elections. These are decidedly positive steps but they are only a start. Lasting change will require, among other things, the full support of the international community.
The need for reform – the “democratization” of the Middle East – is profound. Differences in governance between, say, the monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, and the secular regimes of Syria, Egypt and Tunisia cannot be ignored. But overall, and with exceptions of Turkey, Iran, Israel and Lebanon – and their record stands out only in relative terms – the legacy of these regimes is grim. Decades of one-man rule; reliance on near-hegemonic parties; fawning legislatures with little influence; submissive judicial systems; semi-official media; and inefficient bureaucracies: little wonder that cynicism runs deep throughout the region. In Turkey and Israel, harsh treatment of “national” minorities (Kurds and Palestinians respectively) remains standard fare. In general, the measures taken to date – the release of political opponents here, the granting of new media licenses there – have been tentative and many have fallen to the wayside.
The hurdles are many. The most effective opposition in recent decades has been that of Islamist movements. The challenge here is not simply the accommodation of these movements but, more broadly, the extent to which reference will be made to Islamic law and tradition. Are Islam and democracy compatible? The debate is an old one. It may be heartening to hear Muslim reformists argue for such compatibility but it is also the case that as many other voices argue the need to find alternatives to “Western-style” constitutional democracy, that is, by nurturing Islamic institutions.
No less heated is the debate over the role of women. Independence from colonialism saw efforts to rework marriage, divorce, and inheritance laws. Since Islamic law has traditionally supported, for example, the institution of polygyny, that is, by allowing Muslim men up to four wives, reforms of this kind remain controversial. Related is the debate over the appropriate path: one view is that Western-style feminism is unsuitable since reforms benefiting Muslim women can only be accomplished with reference to Islam. The approach of many “absolutist” Islamist movements, in Iran, Algeria and elsewhere, has been to insist on traditional patterns like seclusion and veiling in the name of "authentic Islam." These efforts are widely decried but illustrate the difficulties at hand. Indigenous women’s organizations remain fully part of these debates.
Other obstacles stand as well. There is the matter of self-interest on the part of Middle Eastern regimes. Why should they proceed? It is not simply that the “rules” of politics will have been decisively altered (if the reforms take hold) but that one likely outcome will be their ouster. Also, such measures, to date, have been imposed from the top down. It is quite wrong to argue that Middle Eastern civil society – that is, independent, non-governmental intellectual and associational life – is absent. Rather it has been subject to such heavy constraints that it remains but a promise of what it could become. As a result, while intellectuals, women’s groups and others argue for change, the ruling cliques initiate the actual reforms. Thus few mechanisms yet exist to assure the longevity and legitimacy of these measures.
To succeed, reform of Middle Eastern politics requires the backing of the international community, the United States in particular. The U.S. record, however, is dismal, with decades of alliance with repressive regimes, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt; on-again-off-again relations with other regimes, including those of Hafez al-Asad and Saddam Hussein; and long-term support of Israel’s policy of denying self-determination to the Palestinians.
Stated support by the Bush Administration for Middle East democratization is all to the good. But recent plans to issue a call for sweeping reform in the region stumbled due to outrage on the part of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others. Such clumsy gestures by the U.S., and the reaction itself, speak volumes. The outrage was not unjustified: policies based on unilateralism and “imperial” presumption are unlikely to produce much benefit. The U.S. and other international players will have to rely on far more nuanced policies. One obvious, if admittedly difficult, step is to devote meaningful resources to the promotion of non-governmental movements so to promote political dialogue and oppositional politics in the Middle East.
Matthew S. Gordon is associate professor of History at Miami University specializing in Middle East history and Islamic studies.